1e2817537b
Closes the gap Workstream D's in-process capability scoping left open: build_scoped_env only gated presence of bread.* bindings, but os.execute/ io.open/debug.* remained fully reachable since a module's Lua still ran inside breadd's own process. A module that declares [[permissions]] in bread.module.toml (including an explicit empty list) is now spawned as a separate bread-module-host process instead, restricted by a Landlock ruleset breadd builds from that module's granted permissions and applies via Command::pre_exec before the child executes any Lua at all. A module with no manifest at all keeps today's in-process, ungated behavior for backward compatibility. - bread-module-host: new minimal binary (mlua + tokio + serde_json) that connects to breadd's existing IPC socket, presents a one-time spawn token, and proxies bread.* calls as RPC instead of direct bindings. - breadd/src/module_host.rs: spawn + token registry + apply_sandbox (Landlock ruleset construction), with unit tests that spawn a real child and verify denial at the OS level, not a Lua-level check. - breadd/src/ipc/module_host_bridge.rs: the module_host.* RPC bridge (on/once/off/emit/after/every/cancel, fs.read/write, exec/exec_capture, state.get, log/warn/error, status) plus the hello handshake. Bumped API_VERSION to 1.6.0. - breadd/tests/module_host_sandbox.rs: end-to-end acceptance tests going through a real spawned breadd + bread-module-host + IPC handshake — os.execute/io.open denied outside a module's granted fs.read scope, and kill -9 on a module-host child leaving breadd and other modules intact while breadd reports bread.module.crashed. - bread-shared/src/module_host_ipc.rs: shared wire types (hello result, tagged event/timer push envelope) so breadd and bread-module-host can't drift on the handshake/push shape. Deferred (documented in Documentation.md's Workstream G section): the trust="in-process" opt-out, remaining bread.* namespaces over RPC (hyprland/widget/machine/bluetooth/notify/state.watch), network sandboxing, and a fully static build that would remove the Execute grant Landlock's dynamic-linker requirement forces on system library dirs.
32 lines
1.1 KiB
TOML
32 lines
1.1 KiB
TOML
[workspace]
|
|
members = [
|
|
"bread-shared",
|
|
"breadd",
|
|
"bread-cli",
|
|
"bread-emit",
|
|
"bread-module-host",
|
|
"xtask",
|
|
]
|
|
resolver = "2"
|
|
|
|
[workspace.dependencies]
|
|
serde = { version = "1.0", features = ["derive"] }
|
|
serde_json = "1.0"
|
|
tokio = { version = "1.40", features = ["full"] }
|
|
anyhow = "1.0"
|
|
tracing = "0.1"
|
|
tracing-subscriber = { version = "0.3", features = ["env-filter"] }
|
|
dirs = "6.0"
|
|
chrono = { version = "0.4", features = ["serde"] }
|
|
tempfile = "3"
|
|
# Pure-Rust bindings to the Linux Landlock LSM syscalls (landlock_create_ruleset/
|
|
# landlock_restrict_self) — kernel 5.13+, no external bwrap/firejail binary
|
|
# dependency. See Workstream G (bread-module-host / breadd's module_host
|
|
# spawner) — the actual OS-level sandboxing mechanism for out-of-process
|
|
# module execution. Verified against this repo's dev kernel (6.18) with a
|
|
# real pre_exec()-restricted child process before adoption: filesystem reads
|
|
# outside the granted rule set are denied at the kernel level
|
|
# (RulesetStatus::FullyEnforced / PartiallyEnforced, EACCES on the denied
|
|
# path), not merely a Lua-level check.
|
|
landlock = "0.4"
|
|
uuid = { version = "1", features = ["v4"] }
|