ufw --force enable runs inside the installer chroot #65
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Delete branch "fix/bos-47-ufw-installer-chroot"
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The installer persists UFW defaults, IPv4/IPv6 mDNS rules, and ENABLED=yes directly in the target filesystem. It makes no UFW CLI call that could probe or change the live kernel. ufw.service applies the saved policy on first boot.
A real headless KVM target-chroot test found that the previous disabled ufw allow call created live filter tables. After this correction, the complete live nft ruleset stayed byte-identical, and two installer runs preserved identical UFW rule files. Rebooting into that target root produced enabled and active ufw.service, deny-inbound/allow-outbound defaults, and both mDNS rules. Exact evidence and limits are in docs/validation/bos-47-firewall.md. This validates the exact installer block and target boot, without claiming an interactive Calamares run. Bash syntax and git diff --check pass.
Closes #47
ufw --force enableruns inside the installer chroot #47ufw --force enableruns inside the installer chroot #47ufw --force enableruns inside the installer chroot #47ufw --force enableruns inside the installer chroot #47Re-review: required Calamares VM install is still outstanding
Acceptance interpretation: (1) a complete installer run must leave the live guest firewall rules unchanged; (2) the installed guest must boot with UFW active, deny inbound and allow outbound, with mDNS allowed; (3) verify this through a VM installation; (4) retain the Unreleased changelog entry.
The target-chroot test in
docs/validation/bos-47-firewall.md:1-28checks the exact persistence block and target boot behavior, and the changelog and implementation are present. The evidence explicitly stops short of a Calamares ISO installation. This is a required issue criterion, so the existing PR is incomplete even though the target-chroot evidence is useful. Forgejo reports no CI statuses for headd6a28be8beeb003ad044532c9974da1198bba4a0; BOS has no ordinary push CI configured.Rework on the existing branch
fix/bos-47-ufw-installer-chroot. Keep PR #65 open and do not open a second PR for BOS-47. No host firewall or desktop config change is needed.ufw --force enableruns inside the installer chroot #47ufw --force enableruns inside the installer chroot #47PR #65 has the implementation and target-chroot firewall checks recorded on the rebased head. A matching-ISO Calamares install with before/after live firewall state and installed UFW checks remains outstanding; BOS has no ordinary push CI. Moving the implementation to REVIEW for the requested handoff. Do not treat as verified or done until those acceptance checks are recorded.